

The figures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (page 73) refer to the USSR as a whole. In the urban areas there was more food available. Indeed, a major purpose of the grain requisition squads was to maintain adequate supplies to the industrial regions. This meant that the misery in the countryside was proportionally greater, with areas such as the Ukraine and Kazhakstan suffering particularly severely. The devastation experienced by the Kazhaks can be gauged from the fact that in this period they lost nearly 90 per cent of their livestock.

### National famine

Starvation, which in many parts of the Soviet Union persisted throughout the 1930s, was at its worst in the years 1932–3, when a national famine occurred. Collectivisation led to despair among the peasants. In many areas they simply stopped producing, either as an act of desperate resistance or through sheer inability to adapt to the violently enforced land system. Hungry and embittered, they made for the towns in huge numbers. It had, of course, been part of Stalin's collectivisation plan to move the peasants into the industrial regions. However, so great was the migration that a system of internal passports had to be introduced in an effort to control the flow.

Despite overwhelming evidence of the tragedy that had overtaken the USSR, the official Stalinist line was that there was no famine. In the whole of the contemporary Soviet press there were only two oblique references to it. This conspiracy of silence was of more than political significance. As well as protecting the image of Stalin the great planner, it effectively prevented the introduction of measures to remedy the distress. Since the famine did not officially exist, Soviet Russia could not publicly take steps to relieve it. For the same reason, it could not appeal, as had been done during an earlier Russian famine in 1921 (see page 25), for aid from the outside world.

Thus what Isaac Deutscher, the historian and former Trotskyist, called 'the first purely man-made famine in history' went unacknowledged in order to avoid discrediting Stalin. Not for the last time, large numbers of the Soviet people were sacrificed on the altar of Stalin's reputation. There was a strong rumour that Stalin's second wife, Nadezdha Alliluyeva, had been driven to suicide by the knowledge that it was her husband's brutal policies that had caused the famine. Shortly before her death she had railed at Stalin: 'You are a tormentor, that's what you are. You torment your own son. You torment your wife. You torment the whole Russian people.'

### The success of collectivisation

Even allowing for the occasional progressive aspect of collectivisation, such as the spread of the mechanised tractors, the overall picture remained bleak. The mass of the peasantry had been uprooted and left bewildered. Despite severe reprisals and coercion, the peasants were unable to produce the surplus food that Stalin demanded. By 1939 Soviet agricultural productivity

**Key question**  
Why could the famine of the early 1930s not be dealt with effectively?

National famine: 1932–3


Key date

**Key question**  
How successful had collectivisation proven to be by 1939?

had barely returned to the level recorded for Tsarist Russia in 1913. But the most damning consideration still remains the man-made famine, which in the 1930s killed between 10 and 15 million peasants.

Yet, leaving aside questions of human suffering, the hard fact is that Stalin's policies did force a large number of peasants to leave the land and go into the factories. There they provided the workforce that enabled the industrialisation programme to be started.

### Summary diagram: Collectivisation



**Key question**  
What were Stalin's aims for Soviet industry in the 1930s?

### 3 | Industrialisation

Stalin described his industrialisation plans for the USSR as an attempt to establish a war economy. He declared that he was making war on the failings of Russia's past and on the class enemies within the nation. He also claimed that he was preparing the USSR for war against its capitalist foes abroad. This was not simply martial imagery. Stalin regarded iron, steel and oil as the sinews of war. Their successful production would guarantee the strength and readiness of the nation to face its enemies.

For Stalin, therefore, industry meant heavy industry. He believed that the industrial revolutions which had made Western Europe and North America so strong had been based on iron and steel production. So, the USSR must adopt a similar industrial pattern in its drive towards modernisation. The difference would

be that, whereas the West had taken the capitalist road, the USSR would follow the path of socialism.

Stalin had grounds for his optimism. It so happened that the Soviet industrialisation drive in the 1930s coincided with the **Depression** in the Western world. Stalin claimed that the USSR was introducing into its own economy the technical successes of Western industrialisation but was rejecting the destructive capitalist system that went with them. Socialist planning would enable the USSR to avoid the errors that had begun to undermine the Western economies.

Soviet industrialisation under Stalin took the form of a series of Five-Year Plans (FYPs). *Gosplan* was required by Stalin to draw up a list of quotas of production ranging across the whole of Soviet industry. The process began in 1928 and, except for the war years 1941–5, lasted until Stalin's death in 1953. There were five separate plans:

- First FYP                    October 1928 to December 1932
- Second FYP                January 1933 to December 1937
- Third FYP                    January 1938 to June 1941
- Fourth FYP                 January 1946 to December 1950
- Fifth FYP                    January 1951 to December 1955

### The first Five-Year Plan 1928–32

The term 'plan' is misleading. The first FYP laid down what was to be achieved, but did not say how it was to be done. It simply assumed the quotas would be met. What the first FYP represented, therefore, was a set of targets rather than a plan.

As had happened with collectivisation, local officials and managers falsified their production figures to give the impression they had met their targets when, in fact, they had fallen short. For this reason, precise statistics for the first FYP are difficult to determine. A further complication is that three quite distinct versions of the first FYP eventually appeared.

Impressed by the apparent progress of the Plan in its early stages, Stalin encouraged the formulation of an 'optimal' plan which reassessed targets upwards. These new quotas were hopelessly unrealistic and stood no chance of being reached. Nonetheless, on the basis of the supposed achievements of this 'optimal' plan the figures were revised still higher. Western analysts suggest the figures in Table 3.3 as the closest approximation to the real figures.

**Table 3.3:** Industrial output

Product (in million tons)	1927–8 First plan	1932–3 'Optimal'	1932 Revised	1932 Actual
Coal	35.0	75.0	95–105	64.0
Oil	11.7	21.7	40–55	21.4
Iron ore	6.7	20.2	24–32	12.1
Pig iron	3.2	10.0	15–16	6.2

### Depression

A period of economic stagnation that began in the USA in 1929 and lasted throughout the 1930s. It affected the whole of the industrial world and was interpreted by Marxists as the beginning of the final collapse of capitalism.

Key term

### Key question

What was the purpose of the first FYP?



'The Five-Year Plan' – a propaganda wall poster of the 1930s, depicting Stalin as the heroic creator of a powerful, industrialised, Soviet Union. He is overcoming the forces of religion, international capitalism, and Russian conservatism and backwardness.

### Propaganda

The importance of these figures should not be exaggerated. At the time it was the grand design, not the detail, that mattered. The Plan was a huge propaganda project, which aimed at convincing the Soviet people that they were personally engaged in a vast industrial enterprise. By their own efforts, they were changing the character of the society in which they lived and providing it with the means of achieving greatness.

Nor, was it all a matter of State coercion, widely used though that was. There was, among the young especially, an enthusiasm and a commitment that suggested that many Soviet citizens believed they were genuinely building a new and better world. The sense of the Soviet people as masters of their own fate was expressed in the slogan, 'There is no fortress that we Bolsheviks cannot storm'.

### Cultural revolution

The term 'cultural revolution' is an appropriate description of the significance of what was being undertaken under Stalin's leadership. Two renowned Western analysts of Soviet affairs, Alec Nove and Sheila Fitzpatrick, have laid stress on this aspect. They see behind the economic changes of this period a real attempt being made to create a new type of individual, *Homo sovieticus* (Soviet man), as if a new species had come into being. Stalin told a gathering of Soviet writers that they should regard themselves as 'engineers of the human soul' (see page 155).

### Successes and achievements

No matter how badly the figures may have been rigged at the time, the first FYP was an extraordinary achievement overall. Coal, iron and electrical power supply all increased in huge

### Key question

How far did the first FYP achieve its objectives?

proportions. The production of steel and chemicals was less impressive, while the output of finished textiles actually declined.

A striking feature of the Plan was the low priority it gave to improving the material lives of the Soviet people. No effort was made to reward the workers by providing them with affordable consumer goods. Living conditions actually deteriorated in this period. Accommodation in the towns and cities remained sub-standard.

The Soviet authorities' neglect of basic social needs was not accidental. The Plan had never been intended to raise living standards. Its purpose was collective, not individual. It called for sacrifice on the part of the workers in the construction of a socialist state, which would be able to sustain itself economically and militarily against the enmity of the outside world.

#### Resistance and sabotage

It was Stalin's presentation of the FYP as a defence of the USSR against international hostility that enabled him to brand resistance to the Plan as 'sabotage'. A series of public trials of industrial 'wreckers', including a number of foreign workers, was used to impress the Party and the masses of the futility of protesting against the industrialisation programme. In 1928 in a prelude to the first FYP, Stalin claimed to have discovered an anti-Soviet conspiracy among the mining engineers of Shakhty in the Donbass region. Their subsequent public trial was intended to frighten the workers into line. It also showed that the privileged position of the skilled workers, the 'bourgeois experts', was to be tolerated no longer.

This attack upon the experts was part of a pattern in the first FYP, which emphasised quantity at the expense of quality. The push towards sheer volume of output was intended to prove the correctness of Stalin's grand economic schemes. Sheila Fitzpatrick has termed this 'gigantomania', the worship of size for its own sake. This may be interpreted as a shrewd judgement on Stalin's part. He knew that the untrained peasants who now filled the factories would not turn immediately into skilled workers. It made sense, therefore, at least in the short term, to ignore the question of quality and to emphasise quantity. The result very often was that machines, factories, and even whole enterprises were ruined because of the workers' lack of basic skills.

Stalin was seemingly untroubled by this. His notions of industrial 'saboteurs' and 'wreckers' allowed him to place the blame for poor quality and under-production on managers and workers who were not prepared to play their proper part in rebuilding the nation. He used OGPU agents and Party *cadres* to terrorise the workforce. 'Sabotage' became a blanket term used to denounce anyone considered not to be pulling his weight. The simplest errors, such as being late for work or mislaying tools, could lead to such a charge.

At a higher level, those factory managers or foremen who did not meet their production quotas might find themselves on public trial as enemies of the Soviet state. In such an atmosphere, fear

**Key question**  
Why was there so little resistance to the FYP?

**Cadres**  
Party members who were sent into factories and onto construction sites to spy and report back on managers and workers.

Key term

and recrimination flourished. Doctoring official returns and inflating output figures became normal practice. Everybody at every level was engaged in a huge game of pretence. This was why Soviet statistics for industrial growth were so unreliable and why it was possible for Stalin to claim in mid-course that since the first FYP had already met its initial targets, it would be shortened to a four-year plan. In Stalin's industrial revolution appearances were everything. This was where the logic of 'gigantomania' had led.


**Key question**  
How far was the first FYP planned from the top?

#### Stalin: the master-planner?

The industrial policies of this time had been described as 'the Stalinist blue-print' or 'Stalin's economic model'. Modern scholars are, however, wary of using such terms. Norman Stone, for example, interprets Stalin's policies not as far-sighted strategy but as 'simply putting one foot in front of the other as he went along'. Despite the growing tendency in all official Soviet documents of the 1930s to include a fulsome reference to Stalin, the master-planner, there was in fact very little planning from the top.

Stalin's government exhorted, cajoled and bullied the workers into ever greater efforts towards ever greater production, but such planning as there was occurred not at national but at local level. It was the regional and site managers who, struggling desperately to make sense of the instructions they were given from on high, formulated the actual schemes for reaching their given production quotas. This was why it was so easy for Stalin and his Kremlin colleagues to accuse lesser officials of sabotage while themselves avoiding any taint of incompetence.

#### Summary diagram: The first FYP



### The second and third Five-Year Plans

Although the second and third FYPs were modelled on the pattern of the first, the targets set for them were more realistic. Nevertheless, they still revealed the same lack of co-ordination that had characterised the first. Over-production occurred in some parts of the economy, under-production in others, which often resulted in whole branches of industry being held up for lack of vital supplies. For example, some projects had too little timber at times, while at other times enough timber but insufficient steel. Spare parts were hard to come by, which often meant that broken machines stood unrepaired and idle for long periods.

The hardest struggle was to sustain a proper supply of materials; this often led to fierce competition between regions and sectors of industry, all of them anxious to escape the charge of failing to achieve their targets. As a result there was hoarding of resources and a lack of co-operation between the various parts of the industrial system. Complaints about poor standards, carefully veiled so as not to appear critical of Stalin and the Plan, were frequent. What successes there were occurred again in heavy industry where the second FYP began to reap the benefit of the creation of large-scale plants under the first FYP.

### Scapegoats

The reluctance to tell the full truth hindered genuine industrial growth. Since no-one was willing to admit there was an error in the planning, faults went unchecked until serious breakdowns occurred. Then followed the familiar search for scapegoats. It was during the period of the second and third FYPs that Stalin's political purges were at their fiercest. In such an all-pervading atmosphere of terror the mere accusation of 'sabotage' was taken as a proof of guilt. Productivity suffered as result. As Alec Nove observes (see page 85):

Everywhere there were said to be spies, wreckers, diversionists. There was a grave shortage of qualified personnel, so the deportation of many thousands of engineers and technologists to distant concentration camps represented a severe loss.

### Workers and the Plans

Despite Stalin's statements to the contrary, the living standards of the workers failed to rise. This was due, in part, to the effects of the famine, but also to the continuing neglect in the Plans of consumer goods. Beyond the comfort to be gained from feeling that they were engaged in a great national enterprise, a theme constantly emphasised in the Soviet press, there were few material rewards to help the workers endure the severity of their conditions. Moreover, they had to accept their lot without complaint.

#### Key question

What were the main strengths and weaknesses of the second and third Five-Year Plans?

Second FYP: 1933–7

Third FYP: 1938–41

Key dates

#### Key question

How were the workers affected by the FYPs?

### The Stakhanovite movement, 1935

The Party's control of newspapers, cinema and radio meant that only a favourable view of the Plans was ever presented. The official line was that all was well and the workers were happy. Support for this claim was provided by the Stakhanovite movement, which was exploited by the authorities to inspire or shame workers into raising their production levels still higher. It was officially claimed in August 1935 that Alexei Stakhanov, a miner in the Donbass region, had produced in one five-hour shift over 14 times his required quota of coal. Whatever the truth of the story, his feat was seized on by the authorities as a glorious example of what was possible in a Soviet Union guided by the great and wise Joseph Stalin.

### Workers' rights

After 1917, the Russian trade unions had become powerless. In Bolshevik theory, in a truly socialist state such as Russia now was, there was no distinction between the interests of government and those of the workers. Therefore, there was no longer any need for a separate trade union movement. In 1920 Trotsky had taken violent steps to destroy the independence of the unions and bring them directly under Bolshevik control. The result was that after 1920 the unions were simply the means by which the Bolshevik government enforced its requirements upon the workers.

Under Stalin's industrialisation programme any semblance of workers' rights disappeared. Strikes were prohibited and the traditional demands for better pay and conditions were regarded as selfishly inappropriate in a time of national crisis. A code of 'labour discipline' was drawn up, demanding maximum effort and output; failure to conform was punishable by a range of penalties from loss of wages to imprisonment in forced labour camps. On paper, wages improved during the second FYP, but in real terms, with food rationing and high prices, living standards were lower in 1937 than they had been in 1928.

### Living and working conditions

Throughout the period of the FYPs, the Soviet government asserted that the nation was under siege. It claimed that unless priority was given to defence needs, the very existence of the USSR was at risk. Set against such a threat, workers' material interests were of little significance. For workers to demand improved conditions at a time when the Soviet Union was fighting for survival was unthinkable; they would be betraying the nation. It was small wonder, then, that food remained scarce and expensive and severe overcrowding persisted.

Nearly all workers lived in overcrowded apartments. Public housing policy did produce a large number of tenement blocks in towns and cities. These were usually five-storey structures with no lifts. Quite apart from their architectural ugliness they were a

hazard to health. So great was the overcrowding that it was common for young families to live with their in-laws and equally common for four or five families to share a single lavatory and a single kitchen, which was often no more than an alcove with a gas-ring. There were rotas for the use of these facilities. Queuing to relieve oneself or to cook was part of the daily routine.

There was money available, but the government spent it not on improving social conditions but on armaments. Between 1933 and 1937, defence expenditure rose from four to 17 per cent of the overall industrial budget. By 1940, under the terms of the third FYP, which renewed the commitment to heavy industrial development, this proportion had reached 33 per cent.

Despite the official adulation of Stalin for his great diplomatic triumph in achieving the Non-aggression Pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 (see page 119) there was no relaxation within the Soviet Union of the war atmosphere. Indeed, the conditions of the ordinary people became even harsher. An official decree of 1940 empowered Stalin's government to encroach even further on workers' liberties. Direction of labour, enforced settlement of undeveloped areas, and severe penalties for slacking and absenteeism: these were some of the measures imposed under the decree.

In 1941, when the German invasion effectively destroyed the third FYP, the conditions of the Soviet industrial workers were marginally lower than in 1928. Yet whatever the hardship of the workers, the fact was that in 1941 the USSR was economically strong enough to engage in an ultimately successful military struggle of unprecedented duration and intensity. In Soviet propaganda, this was what mattered, not minor questions of living standards. The USSR's triumph over Nazism would later be claimed as the ultimate proof of the wisdom of Stalin's enforced industrialisation programme.

Yet despite their victory in war, the Soviet people received few material rewards for their prodigious efforts. Stalin's post-war concerns remained industrial recovery and national defence. The annual budgets down to his death in 1953 showed a decline in the amount dedicated to improving living conditions. Rationing was formally ended in 1947 but this was not a real sign that shortages had been overcome; a widespread black-market, officially condemned but tolerated in practice, was necessary for the workers to supplement their meagre resources. Accommodation was scarcer and conditions in the factories were grimmer than they had been in wartime. Real wages were not permitted to rise above subsistence level and the rigours of the 'Labour Code' were not relaxed. When Stalin died in 1953 the lot of the Russian worker was harder than at any time since 1917.

The German invasion and occupation of Russia: June 1941

Key date

**Labour Code**  
Severe regulations imposed on the workers.

Key term

### Key question

How successful were Stalin's economic reforms?

### Strengths of the reforms

In judging the scale of Stalin's achievement it is helpful to cite such statistics relating to industrial output during the period of the first three FYPs as are reliable. The data in Table 3.4 are drawn from the work of the economic historian E. Zaleski, whose findings are based on careful analysis of Soviet and Western sources.

Table 3.4: Industrial output during the first three FYPs

	1927	1930	1932	1935	1937	1940
Coal (million tons)	35	60	64	100	128	150
Steel (million tons)	3	5	6	13	18	18
Oil (million tons)	12	17	21	24	26	26
Electricity (million kWh)	18	22	20	45	80	90

They indicate a remarkable increase in production overall. In a little over 12 years, coal production had grown five times, steel six, and oil output had more than doubled. Perhaps the most impressive statistic is the one showing that electricity generation had quintupled. These four key products provided the basis for the military economy, which enabled the USSR not only to survive four years of German occupation but eventually to amass sufficient resources to turn the tables and drive the German army out of Soviet territory. The climax of this was the Soviet defeat of Germany in May 1945.

### Key question

What were the limitations of Stalin's reforms?

### Weaknesses


Stalin's economic reforms succeeded in the traditional areas of heavy industry. In those sectors where unskilled and forced labour could be easily used, as in the building of large projects such as factories, bridges, refineries and canals, the results were impressive.

However, the Soviet economy itself remained unbalanced. Stalin gave little thought to developing an overall economic strategy. Nor were modern industrial methods adopted. Old, wasteful techniques, such as using massed labour rather than efficient machines, continued to be used. Vital financial and material resources were wasted.

Stalin's love of what he called 'the Grand Projects of Communism' meant that no real attention was paid to producing quality goods that could then be profitably sold abroad to raise the money the USSR so badly needed. The simple fact was that Stalin's policies had deprived the Soviet Union of any chance to compete with the modernising economies of Europe and the USA.

The other major failing of the policies was their inability to increase agricultural productivity or to raise the living standards

of the Soviet workers. Stalin's neglect of agriculture, which continued to be deprived of funds since it was regarded as wholly secondary to the needs of industry, proved very damaging. The lack of agricultural growth resulted in constant food shortages, which could be met only by buying foreign supplies. This drained the USSR's limited financial resources.



#### 4 | The Key Debate

Many historians have contributed to the analysis of Stalin's economic policies, which remain a lively area of discussion. The central question that scholars address is:

Did the policies benefit the Soviet Union and its people or were they introduced by Stalin primarily to consolidate his political hold on the USSR?

##### Alec Nove

Argued strongly that Stalin's collectivisation and industrialisation programmes were bad economics. They caused upheaval on the land and misery to the peasants without producing the industrial growth that the USSR needed. Furthermore, the condition of the industrial workers deteriorated under Stalin's policies. The living standards of Soviet factory-workers in 1953 were barely higher than in 1928, while those of farm-workers were actually lower than in 1913.

##### Robert Conquest

An especially sharp critic of Stalin's totalitarianism, he remarked: 'Stalinism is one way of attaining industrialisation, just as cannibalism is one way of attaining a high protein diet'.

##### Leonard Shapiro

Contended that had the industrial growth under the tsars continued uninterrupted beyond 1914 it would have reached no less a level of expansion by 1941 than that achieved by Stalin's terror strategy.

##### Norman Stone

Has supported this projection by arguing that without the expertise and basic industrial structures that already existed in Russia before 1917 the Five-Year Plans would have been unable to reach the level of success that they did.

##### Sheila Fitzpatrick

Broadly agreed with Nove's and Conquest's criticisms; she added that Stalin's 'gigantomania', his obsession with large-scale projects, distorted the economy at a critical time when what was needed was proper investment and planning. She stressed, however, that Stalin's policies need to be seen in a broad social and political context. Harsh though Stalin was, he was trying to bring stability to a Soviet Russia that had known only turmoil and division since 1917.

##### Dmitri Volkogonov

Dmitri Volkogonov, who saw things at first hand as a soldier and administrator in 1930s' Russia, suggested that the real purpose of

Stalin's policies was only incidentally economic; the Soviet leader was aiming at removing all opposition to himself by making his economic policies a test of loyalty. To question his plans was to challenge his authority.

### Peter Gattrell

An interesting viewpoint was offered by Peter Gattrell, who built on the arguments first put forward by E.H. Carr. He acknowledged that Stalin was certainly severe and destructive in his treatment of people but pointed out that the outcome of collectivisation and industrialisation was an economy strong enough to sustain the USSR through four years of the most demanding of modern wars. Gattrell suggested that, hard though it is for the Western liberal mind to accept, it may be that Russia could not have been modernised by any other methods except those used by Stalin.

### Some key books in the debate

- E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia* (Macmillan, 1979).  
 Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (Penguin, 1971).  
 Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow* (Macmillan, 1988).  
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Cornell, 1992).  
 Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed), *Stalinism: New Directions* (Routledge, 2000).  
 Peter Gattrell, *Under Command: The Soviet Economy 1924–53* (Routledge, 1992).  
 Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (Penguin, 1972).  
 Alec Nove, *Stalinism and After* (Allen and Unwin, 1975).  
 Leonard Shapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Routledge, 1970).  
 Norman Stone, *The Eastern Front* (Penguin Books, 1998).  
 Dmitri Volkogonov, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire* (HarperCollins, 1998).  
 Dmitri Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991).

## Study Guide: AS Questions

### In the style of AQA

Read the following source and answer the questions that follow.

*Adapted from: a contemporary account of the migration from the rural to urban areas.*

Agricultural technicians ... were arrested in thousands and made to appear in huge sabotage trials so that responsibility might be unloaded on somebody.

- What is meant by sabotage in the context of the USSR in the 1930s? (3 marks)
- Explain why migration from rural to urban areas was so great in the 1930s. (7 marks)
- 'Stalin's collectivisation and industrial programmes were bad economics in the USSR in the 1930s.' Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement. (15 marks)

### Exam tips

*The cross-references are intended to take you straight to the material that will help you to answer the questions.*

- You should provide a brief explanation of the meaning of sabotage, linked to the context. These could include:
  - Examples of 'sabotage' charges, e.g. simple errors such as mislaying tools with the supposed purpose of slowing down production, not meeting quotas (pages 78–9).
  - The 'sabotage' concept used as a technique for enforcing the Five-Year Plans (pages 79–80).
- You have to demonstrate explicit understanding of a range of factors and draw conclusions about their relative significance, for example:
  - The ways in which it was a planned policy (pages 71–2).
  - The ways in which it was a result of the famine (pages 74–5).
  - Remember to show how your factors inter-relate and provide some overall judgement.
- You should evaluate the extent to which Stalin's policies were bad economics by:
  - Debating the definition of bad economics in the context of Stalin's 1930s' regime.
  - Showing support for and against the argument.
  - Showing an appreciation of the aims and outcomes of Stalin's economic policies (pages 68–79).

Remember in your answer to do two essential things:

- Show the points where you agree or disagree with the statement.
- Make it clear why you find the statement convincing or otherwise by explaining your decision.